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This paper studies the role of collateral constraints in transforming small monetary shocks into
large persistent output ﬂuctuations. We do this by introducing money in the heterogeneous-
agent real economy of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Money enters in a cash-in-advance constraint
and is injected via open-market operations. We ﬁnd that a one-time exogenous monetary shock
generates persistent movements in aggregate output, whose amplitude depends on whether or
not debt contracts are contingent. If contingent contracts cannot be written, money shocks can
trigger large output ﬂuctuations. In this case a one time money expansion triggers a boom, while
money contractions generate recessions. In contrast, if contracts are contingent ampliﬁcation is
not only smaller, but it can generate the reverse results. When the possibility of default and
renegociation is considered, the model can generate asymmetric business cycles with recessions
milder than booms. Finally, one-time shocks monetary shocks generate a highly persistent
dampening cycle rather than a smoothly declining deviation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The extent and mechanism through which monetary policy aﬀects real economic activity over
the business cycles has been a long-standing question in macroeconomics. Diﬀerent mechanisms
that explain the propagation of money shocks have been proposed. These include sticky prices,
wage contracting, monetary misperceptions, and limited participation.1 Another mechanism that
has received special attention in recent years is credit-market imperfections. In particular, the
agency-cost model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) has been extended to monetary environments in
order to analyze how ﬂuctuations in borrowers’ net worth can contribute to the ampliﬁcation and
persistence of exogenous money shocks to the economy- see Fuerst (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).2
In contrast with these agency-costs models, little attention has been devoted to analyzing mon-
etary economies in which agents face endogenous credit limits determined by the value of collater-
alized assets. The environment we have in mind is one in which lenders cannot force borrowers to
repay their debts unless debts are secured. Using real-economy models, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Kiyotaki (1998) and Kocherlakota (2000) among others, have shown that collateral constraints may
be a powerful mechanism of ampliﬁcation and persistence of real shocks.3 These papers show that
when debts need to be fully secured by collateral, say land, and the collateral is also an input in
production, then a small shock to the economy can be largely ampliﬁed. For instance, a small
negative shock that reduces the net worth of credit-constrained ﬁrms forces them to curtail their
investment in land. Land prices and output fall because credit-constrained ﬁrms are by nature
more productive in the use of land. The fall in the value of the collateral reduces even more the
1See Cooley and Hansen (1998) for an illustration of the role of monetary shocks in the equilibrium business cycle
theory.
2Credit-market imperfections in these models emerge from asymmetric information and costly-state veriﬁcation.
In this framework, entrepreneurs borrow to pay the amount of the factor bill that is not covered by their net worth.
Lenders must pay a monitoring cost in order to observe the entrepreneur’s project outcome. If an entrepreneur has
little net worth invested in the project, monitoring costs increase because there is larger divergence between the
interests of the entrepreneur and the lender, and so the premium for external ﬁnancing is larger. With procyclical
net worth, periods of low output are associated with higher monitoring costs and a higher external ﬁnance premium.
This mechanism ampliﬁes the eﬀects of external shocks on production and investment.
3Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) also study the eﬀects of borrowing contraints in the presence of uninsurable risk.
They simulate a lump-sum monetary injection that changes the distribution of assets across agents.
2debt capacity of constrained ﬁrms, causing additional falls in investment, land prices, and output.
This paper studies the potential role of collateral constraints as a transmission mechanism of
monetary shocks. We do this by introducing a cash-in-advance constraint for consumption and
investment in the real-economy model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We exploit the simplicity of
this framework to study monetary injections carried out via open-market operations, as opposed
to the less realistic but simpler helicopter drops employed by many monetary models. Due to the
presence of credit-market imperfections, the exact path of the money supply is crucial to determine
the real eﬀects of open-market operations. We choose a parsimonious type of monetary paths which
avoid changes in long-run inﬂation and ﬁscal variables. Thus, current monetary expansions need to
be oﬀset by future monetary contractions to avoid changes in inﬂation or unstable government-bond
paths. As in the real-economy models, the price of the collateral plays a central role in generating
large and persistent eﬀects of exogenous shocks. Moreover, the response of the nominal interest
rate becomes also critical in determining the eﬀects of shocks.4
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that a one-time monetary shock can generate persistent
movements in aggregate output, whose amplitude depends on whether or not debt contracts are
contingent. In particular, if contingent contracts cannot be written, then unanticipated money
shocks can trigger large output ﬂuctuations. In this case a one-time unanticipated money expansion
triggers an economic boom, while unanticipated money contractions generate depressions. The
basic mechanism at work is the Fisher eﬀect, according to which unexpected debt-deﬂation (even
if small) redistributes resources from borrowers to lenders. In our model, due to the existence of
collateral constraints, this Fisher eﬀect can signiﬁcantly amplify output ﬂuctuations. In contrast,
if contracts are contingent upon the monetary shock, output ampliﬁcation is not only smaller,
but it is possible for money expansions to generate output downturns. This occurs because even
though contingent contracts prevent any redistribution of resources from lenders to borrowers, the
inﬂationary tax reduces borrowers’ net worth.
Unanticipated shocks may induce default and renegotiation if expost, the value of debts exceed
4In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000) the equilibrium interest rate is constant.
3the collateral value. The possibility of renegotiation can generate asymmetric business cycles as
default may occur during depressions but not during booms. We ﬁnd that if contracts are non-
contingent, an unanticipated monetary contraction reduces the value of the collateral and therefore
may induce default and renegotiation, depending on the timing of the shock. Renegotiation beneﬁts
borrowers and prevents a larger output downturn, i.e. renegotiation can substantially reduce output
ampliﬁcation.
A third property of the model is that monetary shocks trigger highly persistent dampening
cycles rather than smoothly declining deviations. This occurs due to the interplay between cash-
in-advance and collateral constraints. In particular, the full impact of a shock that increases net
worth is delayed in this model because with a binding cash-in-advance constraint, collateral can only
be accumulated gradually. The cyclical dynamics of the model is consistent with the hump-shaped
pattern of output response to monetary shocks that has been observed in the data.5
Finally, the model also generates endogenous limited participation in the government-bonds
market due to the fact that in equilibrium, collateral constraints are binding only for a set of
agents. This implies that only unconstrained agents hold government bonds and can participate in
open-market operations. In this context, the propagation of the money shock is nontrivial because
agents diﬀer not only in whether they are or not credit constrained, but also in their productivity.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes
the steady state. In Section 3 we discuss the dynamics of the model in response to a monetary
shock. The dynamic structure of the model can be summarized by a nonhomogeneous second-
order diﬀerence equation in the distribution of capital across agents. We parameterize the model
and provide a numerical illustration of the dynamics in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Technical details omitted in the text are presented in the Appendix.
5See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).
42 The model
The model for this heterogeneous-agent economy is an extension of the framework of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). We keep the main features of their model and introduce money using a cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint. There are two goods in this economy: a durable asset (capital), and a
nondurable commodity (output). We focus on the eﬀects of monetary shocks on the distribution of
capital across agents and abstract from capital accumulation. Capital is available in an aggregate
ﬁxed amount K.
There are two types of private agents in this economy. They are both risk neutral, but operate
diﬀerent technologies and have distinct discount factors. As will become clear below, around the
steady state the more patient agents become lenders, while the impatient agents become borrowers.
To abbreviate, let us refer to the two types of agents as borrowers and lenders. Both types of agents
face a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint and a collateral constraint. Finally, the government in this
economy has the only role of controlling money supply through open-market operations.
Events in this model occur as follows. Assume that there are two identical members per house-
hold who carry out diﬀerent activities. Households enter each period with money balances stored
from the previous period. Production takes place overnight. Early in the morning households
observe the money shock and borrowers repay their outstanding debts in output.6 During the day,
all markets are opened simultaneously. The ﬁrst member of the household uses the money balances
to make transactions in both the capital and goods markets. He can buy or sell capital, and buy
goods. The second member stays at home selling the goods the household has produced, making
transactions in the money market and contracting new debt. Financial transactions must satisfy a
standard budget constraint for the household, as well as a collateral constraint.
6Borrowers repay their outstanding debts at the beginning of the period to ensure that if the debt is repudiated,
lenders can appropriate the collateral. As in other CIA models, we assume that households value the diﬀerent
“types” of output produced by other households. This implies that when lenders get paid in output, they will sell it
in exchange for money, and buy other varieties of output.
52.1 Lenders
The mass of lenders in the economy is n. Lenders diﬀer from borrowers in their production tech-
nology and preferences. Lenders use a strictly concave technology, and they are more patient than
borrowers. Their production function is given by yt = G(k0
t−1), where G0 > 0, G00 < 0, G0(0) = ∞,
and k0
t−1 is their capital stock at the end of last period. Lenders choose sequences of consumption
{x0
t}, capital holdings {k0
t}, nominal money balances {m0
t}, bonds holdings {b0
t},a n dg o v e r n m e n t -
bonds purchases {h0
t}, to solve the following problem for given sequences of output prices {pt},






















where the prime denotes a lender’s decision variable. We deﬁne the nominal rate Rt as the interest
rate paid at t on loans made at t − 1. Equation (1) is the CIA constraint. Money is required for
both consumption ptx0
t and investment qn
t (k0
t − k0
t−1). Equation (2) is the budget constraint. The
revenues collected through output sales ptG(k0
t−1), new bonds issued b0
t, and the proceeds from
government-bond holdings Rth0
t−1 must be enough to accumulate new money balances m0
t,p a y
outstanding debt obligations Rtb0
t−1, and purchase government bonds h0
t.
Let β
0tΩt be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the CIA constraint and β
0tΛt the one for the




t : Λt = β0Ωt+1,
7These are the ﬁrst order conditions for interior solutions. Assumptions above guarantee such result.
6b0
t,h 0
t : Λt = β0Rt+1Λt+1,
k0
t : qn
t Ωt − β0qn
t+1Ωt+1 = β0Λt+1pt+1G0(k0
t).
From the optimality conditions above is easy to obtain expressions for the nominal interest rate












pt is the inﬂation between t and t +1 . Equation (4) states that lenders equate
their users cost of capital with the present value of its marginal product. Since in equilibrium these
agents are not credit constrained, the users cost is simply the diﬀerence between the cost of buying
capital today qt and the discounted value of selling capital tomorrow β0qt+1. Notice that the lenders’
u s e r sc o s ti sn o ta ﬀected by inﬂation since the proceeds of selling the capital can be consumed or
invested immediately, without requiring previous accumulation of cash. In contrast, the marginal
product of capital has to be discounted by
β02
1+πt+1because output needs to be exchanged for money
before it can be consumed. This means that the investor has to wait two periods and pay the
inﬂation tax before he can consume the returns of the investment.
2.2 Borrowers
The measure of borrowers is normalized to one. Their technology is given by the production
function yt =( a + c)kt−1. They choose sequences of consumption {xt}, capital holdings {kt},
nominal money balances {md
t}, private issued bonds {bt}, and government-bonds purchases {ht}
to solve the following problem for given sequences of output prices, nominal capital prices, nominal







t (kt − kt−1)+ptxt ≤ md
t−1, (5)
md
t + Rtbt−1 + ht ≤ (a + c)ptkt−1 + bt + Rtht−1, (6)
Rt+1bt ≤ qn
t+1kt, (7)
In addition to the CIA and budget constraints, borrowers face a collateral constraint, given by
equation (7). Borrowing can only take place up to the point where the principal plus interest Rt+1bt
is secured by the market value of the capital owned by the household qn
t+1kt. Lenders also face a
collateral constraint but we did not explicitly write it. Around the steady state this constraint is
not binding under the following assumption:
Assumption 1. β0 > β.
It is also assumed that only the fraction a of the output is tradable between borrowers and
lenders. The fraction c can be traded only among borrowers, and it can be interpreted as a
subsistence minimum consumption. We refer to this fraction as the nontradable output. The
purpose of the assumption is to avoid the situation in which borrowers continuously postpone
consumption.8
In Appendix A we prove that around the steady state of the model the borrower’s optimal
plan is to consume only the nontradable fraction of output, i.e. xt = ckt−1,t ob o r r o wu pt ot h e
limit imposed by the collateral constraint, and to invest all remaining resources. This implies that
borrowers do not purchase government bonds, i.e. ht = 0, and that the CIA constraint is binding.
Notice that since borrowers do not hold government bonds while lenders do, this model generates
endogenous limited participation in this market. These results hold under the following additional
assumption
8Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce a similar assumption. As will be explained later on, due to the linearity of
preferences borrowers would like to continuosly postpone consumption in exchange for investment. This is avoided
by introducing a nontradable fraction of output, which we think of as subsistence minimum consumption. Notice
that money is required to buy nontradable output because this type of output can be traded among borrowers. One







(2 − β − β0)
(1 − β0)
.
This condition is easy to satisfy if the discount factors are close to 1.9 We can use equations

























pt is the real price of capital. The term in brackets corresponds to the real net worth
of borrowers, which consists of the value of tradable output akt−1, plus the value of capital held





pt−1 , minus the real value of debt repayments Rt
1+πt−1
bt−1
pt−1, minus money balances reserved
for next period’s purchases
md
t
pt . Finally, the users cost of capital for borrowers, ut, is given by




Thus, equation (8) says that borrowers use all their net worth to ﬁnance the diﬀerence be-
tween the value of their capital qtkt and the amount they can borrow against each unit of capital
qt+1
Rt+1 (1 + πt)kt in real terms. Notice that borrowers discount the future value of the capital at the
nominal interest rate. This is the case, as will become clear below, because in equilibrium borrowers
need to borrow in order to buy capital.
2.3 Government
The government controls money supply in this economy through open-market operations (OMOs),
which take place in the bonds market. Let Hs
t be the nominal supply of government-issued bonds.
9In this case,
(2−β−β0)
(1−β0) is some constant near to 2, and
(1−β)
β2 is close to zero. Further, in the proposed equilibrium
c
a is the ratio between the marginal propensity to consume and the marginal propensity to save for borrowers, which
c a nb ea s s u m e dt ob eb o u n d e da w a yf r o mz e r o .
9The stock of money supply, Ms









t−1, τ ≥ 0 (11)
so that at time t the government withdraws an amount τHs
t−1 of money and injects RtHs
t−1 back
into the economy. There are two comments in order. First, we choose a simple law of motion
for government bonds Hs
t . This simplicity is convenient for our purpose of analyzing the eﬀects
of a one-time money shock. Notice that following this shock, unless τ < 1 for all t,g o v e r n m e n t
bonds may exhibit an explosive path. To avoid this, any one-time money expansion through OMOs
must be eventually followed by a “policy reversal” or “sterilization” that guarantees convergence
back to the steady state. In particular, the size of τ determines the speed at which such monetary
contraction takes place. In the analysis below we consider τ very close to 1 in order to simulate
a very slow policy reversal. Since credit markets are imperfect in this economy, real eﬀects of
monetary shocks may depend on the path of government debt. Although we choose a parsimonious
law of motion for Hs
t , we will discuss below the role of the size of τ in our results, as well as other
paths for government debt.
Second, notice that we do not consider a rebate of the inﬂationary tax. Since some agents
face corner solutions, such rebate cannot be lump-sum in general. For example, simple helicopter
drops redistribute wealth, and aﬀect agents decisions. Since here we want to focus on the eﬀects of
the “pure monetary shock”, we do not include any rebates in the model. Tax rebates in fact may
reinforce the results of the paper.10
10The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose the economy starts oﬀ at the steady state and there is a one-time
money expansion. Assume that borrowers were to receive a money transfer that compensates them for the inﬂationary
tax in an amount higher than their optimal consumption. This may happen, for example, with helicopter drops. In
this case, borrowers will buy capital with the extra resources, and next period output would increase. This reinforces
our results because, as will be shown below, in this economy monetary expansions generate booms. More details on
this are available from the authors upon request.






t be the aggregate variables corresponding to the lowercase
individual variables. There are ﬁve markets in the model: consumption goods, capital, money,
private bonds, and public bonds. By Walras’ Law one needs only to consider four of them. The







Bt = bt = −B0
t = −nb0
t,
K = Kt + K0
t = kt + nk0
t,


















which is just the quantity equation.
2.5 Steady state
Deﬁne a steady state where all real variables are constant, and all nominal variables grow at the
constant rate π, which is the steady-state growth rate of money supply. From equations (10) and
(11) it follows that π = τ − 1i fτ ≥ 1, and π =0i fτ < 1.
Next, it is easy to see that the steady-state users cost of capital for lenders and borrowers is the
same: u = u0 = q(1 − β0). Further, since under the proposed equilibrium the collateral constraint
(7) binds for the borrowers, we can use R, u0 and the budget constraint of these agents (6) to
get: u = a + c − Md
pK∗,w h e r eK∗ is the borrowers’ steady-state capital level. Next, using the CIA
11constraint (5) one obtains: Md
p = cK∗ (1 + π), i.e. borrowers’ real money balances exactly cover
their consumption adjusted by inﬂation.
Combining the last two expressions we obtain: u = a − πc.N o t i c et h a ti fπ = 0, we obtain the
intuitive results that Md
p = cK∗, and u0 = u = a. This last equation means in a steady state with
no money growth, the users cost equals the tradable marginal product of capital.








(β0)2 (a − πc) (13)
The equation above, along with Assumption 2 imply that in equilibrium borrowers have higher
marginal product of capital than lenders. The following proposition summarizes the main features
of the steady state.
Propostion 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2,




(β0)2 (a − πc) there exists a unique steady state;
(ii) ∂K∗
∂π 6=0f o r( 1+2 π)c 6= a, so that inﬂation aﬀects the steady-state output Y ∗.
Proof: The existence of a unique steady state level K∗ is guaranteed from the properties of the
production function G(.). It is easy to see that the left-hand side of equation (13) is con-





(β0)2 (a − πc) the left and right-hand side cross only once. Figure 1 illustrates the determina-
tion of the steady state. The second property follows easily.
It is interesting that in the long run money is not superneutral as indicated by Proposition 1,
(ii) even though aggregate capital is constant. It is well known (Abel 1984) that money is not
superneutral if investment enters in the CIA constraint, because inﬂa t i o na c t sa sat a xo nc a p i t a l
accumulation. However, aggregate capital is constant in our model so that the standard result does
not apply. The non-supernetrality arises because inﬂation acts as a tax for all agents, but in the
margin it aﬀects diﬀerently borrowers and lenders. Higher inﬂation decreases the marginal cost
12of investing for both types, i.e. it decreases the users cost of capital. For a given K∗, borrowers
net worth decreases with higher inﬂation because they must demand more money to sustain their
consumption, cK∗. Further, since borrowers are credit constrained, they are in a corner solution.
In contrast, lenders have an interior solution and since u has decreased, their marginal beneﬁto f
investing needs to decrease, which can only happen if lenders’ capital holdings, K − K∗,i n c r e a s e .
Thus, money is not superneutral due to the asymmetric eﬀect of inﬂation on constrained and
unconstrained agents.11
3D y n a m i c s
To simplify the analysis, we only present the dynamics of the model around the steady state,
and assume zero steady-state inﬂation, π =0 . The solution for the case π > 0 is summarized in
Appendix D. We also assume that β0 is close to 1. This occurs, for example, if the length of the
periods is small. This assumption allows as to obtain some sharp analytical results, but numerical




t−1,i . e . gt is
one plus growth rate of money supply, vt ≡
pt+1
pt ,i . e .vt is one plus the inﬂation rate. Thus, in the
steady state, g = v =1+π. In general, let b xt = xt−x∗
x∗ denote the rate of deviation of a variable x
from its steady state value.
Assume that the economy starts oﬀ at the steady state, and that an unexpected one-time
increase in the growth rate of money ε > 0o c c u r sa tt =0 ,i . e . b g0 = ε
1+π. Since the monetary
expansion occurs through OMOs, H0 decreases below its steady state level (H0 < 0). According
to the law of motion for government bonds, Hs
t = τHs
t−1, Ht gradually returns to zero to avoid
changes in the long term inﬂation rate. Thus, the one-time money expansion at t = 0 is followed by
a monetary contraction, i.e. by a “sterilization policy”. In particular, the size of τ < 1 determines
11If the borrowers’ propensity to consume
c
a+c is larger than 0.5 then higher inﬂation reduces output, a result
consistent with Abel (1984). However, if money is injected via helicopter drops rather than via OMOs, higher steady-
state inﬂation may have the opposite results, i.e. higher π implies larger K
∗ and larger Y
∗. This occurs if borrowers
receive a fraction of the transfer higher than their steady-state consumption share, α ≡
cK∗
Y ∗ . In this case, borrowers
are overcompensated for the inﬂationary tax and, as a result, they can aﬀord to buy additional capital with the extra
resources. In addition, inﬂation increases the marginal cost of investing, u, but lenders are particularly hurt because
they face and interior solution.
13the speed at which such monetary contraction takes place.
Using the law of motion of money supply and bonds, one can obtain the following path of money
growth12
b g0 = −∂d0,
and
b gt = −(R − τ)τt−1b g0.
Notice that this path is fully determined by the exogenous initial shock, and converges to zero
at a rate determined by the size of τ. In particular, a larger τ implies a smoother sterilization of
the monetary contraction. In what follows we will assume a τ very close to 1 in order to simulate
a very slow monetary contraction.13
To complete the characterization of the dynamics of the model, we need to solve for the paths
of b vt, b qt and b Kt. Linearizing equation (12) yields
b vt = b gt − ρ
³
b Kt − b Kt−1
´
,
where ρ =( a+c−G
0
) K∗
Ms/p.N o t i c et h a tb v−1 = 0 because both output and the money supply used
for transactions in the goods market are predetermined. Next, linearizing equation (4) we obtain










ρ b Kt+1 − (1 − β0)b gt+1, (14)
where 1
η = −G00K∗
nG0 > 0.14 The equation above describes the forward-looking nature of capital
12Here we compute the absolute deviations of the government-debt to money ratio ∂d0 instead of the percentage











t , transform variables to render
them stationary, and linearize to obtain b gt =( R−τ)∂dt−1. Next, use the law of motion of government debt to obtain
∂dt = τ∂dt−1 = τ
t∂d0, which together with the previous expresion implies that b gt =( R−τ)τ
t−1∂d0 = −(R−τ)τ
t−1b g0.
13When there is a monetary expansion at t =0a n dτ is very close to one, then the money contraction at t =1
is very small. Ideally, for a more “realistic” scenario, one could have a more persistent money expansion, eventually
followed by a contraction. In the context of our simple model, since we analyze a one-time money expansion, by
using τ very close to one most of the subsequent money contraction occurs several period after the money expansion.
14The term
1






K−K∗, and so it can be interpreted as a measure of the
elasticity of the marginal product of borrowers’ capital, weighted by the ratio of borrowers to lenders’ capital in the
14prices, i.e. the price of capital at t = 0 depends on the full path of capital distributions across
types.
Finally, using the three expressions above, as well as the linearized versions of equations (5), (6)
and (7), it is easy to show that b Kt satisﬁes the following non-homogeneous second order diﬀerence
equation for t > 2
θ0 b Kt = θ1 b Kt−1 + θ2 b Kt−2 + µ0τt−2b g0, (15)
where θ0, θ1, θ2,and µ0 are constants that depend on steady-state variables (see Appendix B). It
can be shown that for β0 close to 1, these constants are given by: θ0 =1− ρ > 0, θ1 ≈ 2θ0,
θ2 ≈− θ0,a n dµ0 ≈− (1 − τ)2. This last term reﬂects that a money injection at t = 0 generates a
negative trend in Kt as a result of the sterilization that takes place after the injection.
The previous equation summarizes the equilibrium dynamics of the model. It can be shown
that b Kt exhibits persistent and dampening cycles, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. For β0 suﬃciently close to 1 and π =0 ,
(i) the general solution to (15) is
b Kt = Art cos(ωt − φ)+Aττtb g0 (16)
where A and φ are constants, r =
p





, and Aτ =
µ0
θ0τ2−θ1τ−θ2.15
(ii) r is close to, but less than, 1,a n dω is close to, but larger than, zero.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary. b Kt exhibits persistent and dampening cycles.
The existence of dampening cycles rather than monotonic dynamics occurs in this model due to







15that increases net worth is delayed in this model because with a binding CIA constraint, collateral
can only be accumulated gradually. Recall that investment enters in the CIA constraint. This
cyclical dynamics of the model is consistent with the hump-shaped pattern of output response to
shocks that has been observed in the data.
To fully characterize the equilibrium solution, we require two additional conditions on the
trajectory of b Kt. For reasons that we explain brieﬂy, monetary injections via OMOs imply b K0 =0 .
Thus, the equilibrium path of the distribution of capital can be completely characterized in terms
of b K1. Using these two conditions, we obtain
A =






T h er e s u l tt h a t b K0 = 0 follows from the following four facts: i) the money contraction occurs
in the bonds market; ii) the shopper’s only resources are the money balances accumulated during
the previous period and the land holdings; iii) near the steady state, borrowers’ consumption is
equal to the nontradable output which is predetermined. As a consequence, lenders consumption
is also predetermined; iv) the nominal price of consumption at the moment of the shock does not
change. These facts together imply that at the moment of the shock households cannot change
their investment level.
We now solve for b K1 following a monetary shock at t = 0. For this purpose, combine (5), (6),
and (7) to obtain
















p−1 is the aggregate steady-state level of debt in real terms, and K−1 corresponds to the
borrowers’ steady-state capital level. We consider two relevant cases at this point: non-contingent
and contingent debt contracts. The diﬀerence between these two is that under contingent contracts,
borrowers must compensate lenders for any unexpected inﬂation. Thus, debt repayments at time
zero are immune to period one’s inﬂation π0, i.e., R0B−1 = 1+π0
β0 B−1.
163.1 Non-contingent contracts
When debt contracts are non-contingent, R0 in (17) is simply the steady-state nominal interest
rate R = 1












To solve for b K1 we ﬁrst need to solve for b q1, which in turn depends on the full sequence { b Kt}.
Solving equation (14) forward we can obtain a solution for b q1, as shown in Appendix C. The
expression that relates b q1 with b K1 is algebraically complicated.
We can use equation (18) to gain some intuition on the real eﬀects of a monetary expansion ε > 0
under non-contingent contracts. Suppose initially that the real price of capital remains unchanged
after the monetary shock so that b q1 = 0. In this case, the real eﬀects of the shock depend on the




,t h e nK1,a n da l s oY2, move in the same direction
as the monetary shock. This is always the case because when β0 is close to 1, then τ is close to
2. Finally, this change in the distribution of capital toward the more productive agents induces an
increase in the price of capital, b q1 > 0, which reinforces the initial eﬀect of the shock. Therefore,
a one-time monetary expansion under non-contingent debt contracts induces a redistribution of
capital towards borrowers, and increases output.
3.2 Contingent contracts
As indicated above, if debt contracts are contingent, then R0 = 1+π0
β0 . In this case, linearization of












The equation above is very similar to (18), except that now we have a smaller coeﬃcient on
ε. This smaller coeﬃcient has two important implications. First, the real eﬀects of the one-time
money shock will be smaller than in the case of non-indexed debt contracts, i.e. the redistribution
17of capital as well as the output ampliﬁcation are smaller. Second, diﬀerent from the case of non-
contingent debt contracts, a monetary expansion may now produce an output downturn rather than
ab o o m .T os e ew h y ,a s s u m ef o ram o m e n tt h a tb q1 = 0. In this case, the real eﬀects of the shock
again depend on the size of τ. However, diﬀerent from the non-contingent case, now τ is much




, then the monetary expansion will increase output. But
for β0 close to 1, τ is close to 1. Thus it is possible to ﬁnd τ > τ such that the monetary expansion
generates a downturn.
To better highlight the mechanisms behind this result, it is useful to rewrite equation (17) as












where the left-hand side represents consumption and investment in t = 1, and the right-hand side
are the real balances brought from period t = 0. In particular, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side are output sales; the second term is new debt contracted in t = 0; and the third term is the
repayment for debt contracted in t = −1. Notice that consumption in t =1i sﬁxed because K0
remains at the steady-state level. Thus, the only way borrowers increase their investment in capital
K1, is if the right-hand side of the equation is large than its steady-state value.
First, notice that under contingent debt contracts, since R0 = 1+π0
β0 , then the last term on the
right-hand side does not change with the money expansion, i.e. it remains at its steady-state value.
This implies that lenders do not transfer any wealth to borrowers in the period of the shock via
interest rate repayments.
Second, due to the monetary expansion b g0 > 0, the level of prices in t = 1 increases, so that
π0 increases (b v0 > 0). This hurts borrowers because the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side a+c
1+π0K−1
decreases. Thus, the only way borrowers could increase K1 is if the second term on the right-hand
side
β0q1K0
1+π1 increases by more than the decrease in a+c
1+π0K−1.I ng e n e r a l ,π1 decreases (b v1 < 0) due
to the policy reversal, i.e. the money contraction that follows the one-time expansion. However,
for τ suﬃciently close to 1, case in which the money contraction in t = 1 is very small, the drop in
π1 is so small, that
β0q1K0
1+π1 increases very little. In this case, borrowers decrease K1 and the money
18expansion causes a downturn. In summary, the only way a monetary expansion can generate an
increase in output when debt contracts are indexed is when this expansion is quickly reverted by a
monetary contraction (i.e., small τ).
Finally, notice that when debt is non-contingent, the third term on the right-hand side of (20)
decreases with respect to the steady state because π0 increases due to the money expansion. What
this means is that there is a transfer of wealth from creditors to debtors, which ultimately allows
borrowers to increase K1 and generate an output expansion.16
3.3 Default and asymmetric business cycles
Up to now we have considered the same model of debt as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). There
are two important assumptions in their model. The ﬁr s ti st h a to n c eab o r r o w e rh a ss t a r t e dt o
produce with capital Kt, he is the only one with the skill to complete production in period t +1 .
In other words, if the borrower were to withdraw his labor between t and t + 1, there will be no
output in t + 1. A second assumption is that when the shock arrives, the borrower has already
input his labor into the production project, and so it is too late for him to threaten the creditors
by withdrawing his labor. The borrower thus never has incentives to repudiate his debt contract
i nt h ef a c eo fas h o c k .
Consider now what would happen if the shock arrived before the borrower had input his labor.
In this case, if the value of the collateral falls with the shock below debt value, the borrower can
threaten his creditors by withdrawing his labor and defaulting on his debt. Since there is no output
without the borrower’s labor, then the borrower could be able to renegotiate his debt down to the
market value of the collateral. It turns out that if such renegotiation is possible, then our model can
generate asymmetric business cycles. In particular, if contracts are non-contingent and there is a
monetary contraction, borrowers have incentives to renegotiate their debt and the output downturn
is smoother.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If contracts are non-contingent, the interest rate
16The redistribution of wealth between debtors and creditors following a money shock has been emphasized by
Fisher (1933).
19borrowers pay is the steady-state rate. If there is a money contraction, this steady-state rate will
be higher than the equilibrium rate, due to deﬂation. Thus, borrower’s net worth is reduced, as
well as their capital holdings. This in turn triggers a decrease in the price of capital. In this
case, borrowers have incentives to repudiate their debt and pay back just the market value of the
collateral. The fact that borrowers end up paying back less, makes the output downturn smoother.
Notice that in contrast, if there is a monetary expansion, borrowers will not have incentives to
repudiate and renegotiate their debt. This is so because in this case the price of capital increases,
while the nominal interest rate remains at its steady state.17
Analytically, when debt is renegotiated, R0 in (17) is not the equilibrium value. Rather, the
term R0
B−1






β0b q1 − b q0 +
³




which holds for both the contingent and non-contingent debt cases. It turns out that when debt is











Since the expression above is algebraically simple, we can use it to analyze whether following
the one-time monetary contraction in period t = 0, it is the case that b K1 < 0a n ds ob Y2 < 0.
Further, if b K2 < b K1, since the model exhibits persistent dampening cycles, we should observe a
downturn in the economic activity as borrowers’ capital level decreases. Proposition 3 summarizes
the conditions under which these results hold. Let α ≡ cK∗
Y ∗ < 1 be the fraction of steady-state
output consumed by the borrowers.
17If debt contracts are contingent, renegociation occurs depending on how interest payments change compared to
the change in the price of the collateral. For instance, suppose τ is small enough so that a monetary expansion
triggers an increase in output. Then, if the nominal interest rate increases by more than the increase in the price of
capital, borrowers will have incentives to renegociate.
18Under renegociation, the solution for b K1 i st h es a m ea st h a ti m p l i e db yt h en on-homogeneous second order
diﬀerential equation for t =1a n d b K0 =0 .
20Proposition 3. For β0 suﬃciently close to 1 and π =0 ,
(i) following a one-time decrease in the money growth rate ε < 0 at t =0 , borrowers decrease
their capital holdings in period t =1 ,i . e . b K1 < 0. Further, the lower τ,t h el a r g e r
¯ ¯ ¯ b K1
¯ ¯ ¯ is.
(ii) if τ is suﬃciently close to 1 then b K2 < b K1,w h i l ei fτ → 0 then a suﬃcient condition for
b K2 < b K1 is that α < 1
3.
Proof: (i) When β0 → 1i ti st h ec a s et h a tρ → α and that rh → 0. Then, θ0 → (1 − α). Thus,
when β0 → 1 from equation (21) we have that: b K1 → 2−τ
1−αb g0, and since τ < 1a n db g0 < 0
it follows that b K1 < 0. Notice that the more slowly government debt returns to the steady
state, i.e. the larger τ, the lower the multiplier of monetary policy in the ﬁrst period.




θ0 b g0, and since when β0 → 1w eh a v et h a tR → 1




1−α − (1 − τ)2
i
b g0.I fτ → 1, then b K2 → 1
1−α b K1






b K1,s ot h a t b K2 < b K1 if
α < 1
3.
Part (ii) in Proposition 3 indicates the role of τ in strengthening the real eﬀects of a monetary
contraction. In fact, when the sterilization policy is smooth, i.e. when τ is large, borrowers further
decrease their capital stock in t = 2. This implies that they would be able to borrow less against
their collateral, and their capital holdings will decrease for a number of periods after the shock.
This occurs because when the sterilization is smooth, then the government expands the money
supply in small amounts during several periods, and so the nominal interest rate remains above the
steady state, i.e. b Rt > 0 for a longer time. In contrast, when the monetary contraction is reverted
quickly, i.e. when τ → 0, this dynamic pattern for capital may not necessarily hold, unless further
conditions are imposed.
214 Simulations
To illustrate the magnitude and persistence of monetary shocks in this economy, we assign values
to the parameters of the economy and simulate the eﬀects of a one-time 1% change in the growth
rate of money. The only purpose here is to illustrate the dynamics generated by our model, not
to calibrate our stylized model. As such, the quantitative results presented here are not to be
taken literally. We choose the parameters of the model to satisfy the assumptions imposed. We set
β0 =0 .995 to simulate a time period equal to a month. Note that β0 is close enough to 1, in line
with many of the proofs presented above.
We normalize to unity the total stock of capital, i.e. K = 1, as well as the nontradable fraction
of output, i.e. c = 1. The production technology for lenders is: G(K)=B(K − K)γ,w h e r eB
is also normalized to unity and set γ =0 .3. We set n = 3, which implies that in this economy
only 25% of the agents are constrained. Finally, we choose a steady-state capital distribution of
K =0 .25, i.e. lenders hold 25% of the total capital.
Figure 2 displays the eﬀects of a one-time increase of 1% in the growth rate of money when
π =0 ,τ =0 .9, and debt contracts are non-contingent. The ﬁgure shows percentage deviations from
steady-state values. Since τ is large, the subsequent money contraction is smooth and government
bonds go back gradually to their steady-state Hs = 0. As is shown in the graph, this policy
generates ample and persistent dampening cycles. The cycle starts with an increase in borrowers’
capital holdings, as well as an increase in output. The peak of the cycle is reached about 50 months
after the shock, when output is around 40% above the steady state. Of course, this quantitative
result is unrealistically large and due to non-standard assumptions of the model such as linear
utility. What lies behind such large ampliﬁcation is the redistribution of wealth from lenders to
borrowers due to the non-contingent nature of the debt contract. In the ﬁgure, since the collateral
constraint binds, real borrowers’ debt mimics the behavior of capital.
These results emerge from the combination of two mechanisms that aﬀect both sides of the
collateral constraint: one is the asset-price eﬀect, and the other is the interest-rate eﬀect. First,
there is an increase in real price of capital that increases the value of the collateral for a number of
22periods. This increase in the asset price comes from the fact that to clear the capital market, the
users cost for lenders has to increase. Notice that the real price of capital is above the steady state
for 50 months, which is exactly the time at which capital and bonds reach their peaks. Second, the
nominal interest rate is at its steady-state value in the period of the shock, but it then decreases
below the steady state.
Figure 3 displays the eﬀects of a one-time increase of 1% in the growth rate of money when
π = 0, but now debt contracts are contingent. In this case we choose τ =0 .999 in order to
illustrate the case in which a monetary expansion can generate an output downturn. The most
striking feature of Figure 3 is that even though we observe an output downturn, the real eﬀects
of the money shock under contingent contracts are very small when compared to those obtained
in Figure 2. This clearly highlights the diﬀerence between the non-contingent and the contingent
cases: when debt is contingent, there is no redistribution of wealth from less productive lenders to
more productive borrowers.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the case in which debt renegotiation takes place. It displays the
eﬀects of a one-time decrease of 1% in the growth rate of money when π =0 ,τ =0 .9, and debt is
non-contingent. In this case, the model still exhibits persistence, and the amplitude of the eﬀects
is much smaller than the ones observed in Figure 2. Notice that output reaches a trough of about
−2.5%. Renegotiation avoids a deep economy downturn because it partially protects borrowers
from deﬂation.
5 Concluding comments
This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary shocks by combining collateral and cash-in-
advance constraints in a world where changes in money supply occur via open-market operations.
We ﬁnd that a one-time unanticipated monetary injection generate persistent movements in aggre-
gate output, whose amplitude depends on whether debt contracts are contingent or not. In general,
output ﬂuctuations are larger if contingent contracts cannot be written. Due to the interaction be-
tween the cash-in-advance and collateral constraints, monetary shocks trigger a highly persistent
23dampening cycle rather than a smoothly declining deviation.
The model analyzed here is simple enough to provide insights on how collateral constraints work
in a monetary economy. Since the model is highly stylized, future work can involve the following
extensions. First, both the utility and production functions may be modiﬁed to the more standard
concave speciﬁcation. This would be particularly important if the mechanisms described here were
to be carefully quantiﬁed and compared with the data. Second, in order to avoid excess response in
nominal prices, other frictions would need to be introduced besides collateral constraints. Finally,
the model studied here has not been carefully calibrated to assess its ability to match the data. A
careful calibration exercise is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future work.
In summary, what we learn from the simple, stylized model analyzed here is that collateral
constraints in combination with cash-in-advance constraints, constitute a potential mechanism that
transforms small monetary shocks into signiﬁcant persistent output ﬂuctuations.
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25A Proof of optimal solution for borrowers
We need to prove the claim that borrowers’ optimal plan is to consume only the nontradable fraction
of output, i.e. xt = cKt−1, to borrow up to the limit and to invest all remaining resources. To
do that we compare the utility achieved under the diﬀerent alternative plans. The ﬁrst one is to
follow the proposed investment path. Alternatively, borrowers can consume or save. For these last
two alternatives, we only consider single deviations from the investment path at date t =0 . 19
Consider the borrower’s marginal utility of investing p0 dollars given that all aggregate variables
remain unchanged at their steady state levels. For simplicity let π = 0. In steady state, we have
R =1 /β0and q = a/(1 − β0). Therefore, for given prices and aggregate variables at their steady
state levels, equations (5), (6) and (7) can be rewritten as:






















=( a + c − q)kt−1 + qβ0kt. (A4)



















=2− (1 − β0) − c
q =2− a+c
q
=2− rh.L e trh ≡ a+c





kt−1 +( rh − 1)kt−2 (A6)
It is easy to check that the roots of the associated characteristic polynomial are 1 and 1 − rh.
Therefore, kt can be expressed as:
kt = A1 + A2(1 − rh)t. (A7)
where constants A1 and A1 need to be determined. Under the proposed guess, the optimal strategy
for borrowers is to use the extra p0 dollars to invest in capital. With this amount, the borrower
19Following the logic of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), “we appeal to the principle of unimprovability”, which states
that to prove that our proposed strategy of investing all the extra p0 dollars is optimal, we need to consider only
single deviations from this plan at date t =0 .
26can buy k0 =1 /q units of capital at t = 0. This allows him to borrow qβ0k0 = β0 additional units
of output.20 At t = 1, consumption increases by ck0 units so that from the additional resources,
β0 − c/q can be used to buy capital. Therefore, investment is given by: k1 − k0 =
β0−c/q
q ,s ot h a t








k1 − (1 − rh)k0
i
.























1 − β(1 − rh)
.
To show that higher utility is attained in the investment path than in the consumption path,






1 − β(1 − rh)
> 1




























which corresponds to Assumption 2 in the text.
To complete the proof we need to show that higher utility is attained in the investment path
than in the saving path. Borrowers can save the p0 dollars and use the return R to commence a
strategy of maximum levered investment from date t = 1 onwards. Then, all we need to show is
that the returns from saving p0 dollars in period t = 0 are lower than the return from investing at













Therefore, 1+rh >R, which guarantees that the investment path yields more utility than the
alternative savings path. This completes the proof that the proposed solution is an equilibrium. We
have presented an analytical proof for π =0 .F o rπ 6= 0 it is not possible to provide an analytical
20Note that p0 dollars are equivalent to one unit of output at t = 0 prices. Also, by borrowing extra b0 = β
0,t h e
agent can demand extra β
0 real money balances in the third subperiod of t = 0, in order to buy additional capital in
the ﬁrst subperiod of t =1 .
27proof. However, for all the numerical simulations in the text, we have veriﬁed in the computer that
the decision rules for the borrower are optimal.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let π = 0 so that in steady state u = a. Equation (15) in the text reads:
θ0 b Kt = θ1 b Kt−1 + θ2 b Kt−2 + µ0τt−2b g0 (B1)
where:
θ0 =1+( 1− 2β0)ρ
θ1 =( 1− rh)(1 − ρ)+1+( 1− 2β0)ρ − (1 − β0)
1
η
θ2 = −(1 − rh)(1 − ρ)
µ0 = −(R − τ)
h¡
1 − 2β0¢
τ +( 1− rh)
i
Since the particular solution for the equation above is
b Kp =
µ0b g0τt
θ0τ2 − θ1τ − θ2
then the general solution is given by:
b Kt = A1λt
1 + A2λt
2 + Aττtb g0 (B2)
where Aτ =
µ0
θ0τ2−θ1τ−θ2 is a constant and the eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 satisfy: λ1λ2 = −θ2
θ0 and
λ1 + λ2 = θ1
θ0. Finally, the solutions for constants A1 and A2 can be obtained from: b K1 =
A1λ1 + A2λ2 + Aττb g0 and b K0 = A1 + A2 + Aτb g0.
B.1 Cycles
The dynamic properties of equation (B1) depend on the eigenvalues associated to the homogeneous








The necessary and suﬃcient condition for cycles is θ2
1+4θ0θ2 < 0. Note that θ1can be rewritten
as:




Adding and subtracting proper terms, θ2 can be rewritten as
θ2 = ξ(β0) − θ0 (B4)
28where:
ξ(β0) ≡ 2ρ(1 − β0)+rh(1 − ρ)
=( 1 − β0)(2ρ +
a + c
a
(1 − ρ)) > 0.
¿From (B3) and (B4), θ1 can be written as:
θ1 =2 θ0 − ζ(β0)( B 5 )
where:




















Finally, from (B3) and (B4), lim
β0→1
θ2 = θ0 and lim
β0→1
θ1 =2 θ0.
B.2 Proof of Proposition
To show that for β0 suﬃciently large the model exhibits cycles, it needs to be proven that θ2
1+4θ0θ2 <
0. Use (B4) and (B5) to get:
θ2


























nG0(( ¯ K−K1)/n) > 0w h e r eK1 is the solution of (13) for β0 equal to 1 and
π =0 . Therefore, the second term in the last expression approaches to zero faster than the ﬁrst
term as β0 → 1. Note that θ0
1
η remains bounded above since θ0 approaches 1 − αN(K1) > 0a n d
t h ef a c tt h a t1
η approaches a constant greater than zero. Thus, for β0 large enough the ﬁrst term
dominates and the expression is negative.
It is also useful to state solution (B2) in its polar representation (See Allen, 1959, page 189)
b Kt = Art cos(ωt + φ)+Aττt,










Stability is guaranteed if the modulo r is less than 1, a result that follows from (B5) for large β0.
In addition, r i sc l o s et o1w h e nβ0 is close to 1. Thus, the diﬀerence equation displays persistent
29dampening cycles.
C Forward looking solution for asset prices
This appendix gives the solution for b q0 and π = 0. From equation (14) in the text:
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.
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b K1 +
















θ0 − β0θ1 − β02θ2
¸
Aτb g0
which solves for b q0 as a function of b K1. Also, the following equation relates b q0, b q1 and b K1:
b q0 = β0b q1 +
¡
1 − β0¢
ρπ b K1 +( 1− β0)(R − τ)b g0
30D Solution for π > 0
When the steady-state inﬂation is not zero, but π > 0, then the simple rule that following a one-
time money shock at t = 0 we can guarantee convergence of dt back to the steady state by imposing
τ < 1 does not hold anymore. Recall that since Hs
t = τHs
t−1 and when π =0w eh a v eHs =0 ,
then τ < 1 is enough to guarantee that Hs
t eventually converges to zero. In contrast, this is not
t h ec a s ew h e nπ > 0t h e nd>0. Thus, when π > 0 the “sterilization” policy needs to be changed.
In particular, assume that the economy starts oﬀ the steady state and at time t = 0 there is
an unexpected one-time increase in growth rate of money ε > 0, i.e. b g0 = ε
1+π.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
government chooses a period t = T such that from T on, the growth rate of money supply is zero,
i.e. b gt =0f o rt > T. What this implies is that for t > T,t h el a wo fm o t i o no fb dt is given by:21
b dt =
1
β0 b Rt +
1
β0 b dt−1
which is clearly unstable, since β0 < 1. Iterating forward on the equation above and imposing the
transversality condition that b d∞ = 0, we obtain that b dT−1 must satisfy:




to guarantee convergence back to the steady-state. Further, since using the law of motion of money
supply we have that b gT−1 is given by:





β0 (1 + d)
b RT−1 +
d
β0 (1 + d)
b dT−2
so that b gT−1 depends on b dT−1. In summary, when the government chooses a period T such that
b gT =0 ,i tm u s ta l s oc h o o s eb gT−1 to satisfy the transversality condition. Further for periods
1 ≤ t<T− 2 we allow the government to choose any exogenous law of motion for b gt 6 0, i.e.
any rule in which the monetary expansion at time t = 0 is reverted. For instance, a natural choice
would be a gradual money contraction up to period T − 2a n dac h o i c eo fb gT−1 that satisﬁes the
condition above.
When π > 0, the dynamics of capital are described by:
θπ
0 b Kt = θπ
1 b Kt−1 + θπ






















21This equation is the linearized version of the law of motion of the money supply when b gt =0 .
31θπ
2 = −
(1 − rh)(1 − ρ)
(1 + π)
.
Using the dynamic equation of capital, as well as the transversality condition for government
debt, the law of motion of money supply and the forward-looking solution for capital prices it is
possible to construct a system of 5 equations in 5 unknowns: b KT−1, b qT−2, b qT−1, b dT−1 and b gT−1.
Since this system is a function of past values b KT−3, b KT−2 and b dT−2 an iterative procedure that
starts with a guess for b K1 must be implemented to ﬁnd the solution. Details on the solution
procedure are available from the authors upon request.
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